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Pascas: Clay-kickers of Flanders Fields

Clay-kickers of Flanders Fields
Canadian Tunnellers at Messines Ridge
1916-1917
B R I A N PA S C A S
Abstract : This article explores the Canadian tunnelling companies’
military mining organisation and accomplishments in underground
galleries during the Great War. This comprehensive study explains
the crucial role played by the Canadian engineers, in conjunction
with British and Australian engineers, in the successful detonation of
nineteen deep mines at Messines Ridge, Belgium on 7 June 1917. The
tunnellers’ perseverance and skill were evident that morning when they
slammed home plungers and threw switches igniting the largest planned
explosion up to that time. However, daily hardships and dangers of
underground warfare from the claustrophobic environment to the stress
from the eavesdropping enemy led to disciplinary action including Field
Punishment No. 1.

Tunnellers all, we are “doin’ our bits”
Deep down in the bowels of France;
In the darkness we flits—a-givin’ Fritz fits,
And when WE blows—he’s sure got to dance.1

O

June 7 th , 1917, took place a battle which on the morrow
was hailed as a brilliant military achievement, … the capture of
the Messines ridge by General Plumer’s Second Army was almost the
only true siege-warfare attack made throughout a siege war.”2 B. H.
Liddell Hart’s summation of the operations at Messines-Wytschaete
n

Edward Synton, Tunnellers All, (London: Grant Richards Ltd., 1918), 7.
B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War, (London: Papermac, 1992),
322.

1  
2  
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Ridge marks it as a unique moment in the First World War. In a setpiece offensive, nine divisions from Britain, Ireland, Australia, and
New Zealand assaulted German positions on the ridge immediately
after nineteen mines exploded beneath the ridge at 3:10 a.m. The
tunnelling companies that blew the mines are not given adequate
recognition for this complete tactical victory, and are generally
unidentified, especially in Great War secondary sources.
Canadians played an important role on that day as well. Canadian
tunnelling companies detonated five mines and an analysis of their
underground work in the 1916 and 1917 tunnelling operations attests
to their solid contribution to the success of the Battle of Messines
Ridge. Their toil—involving specialised equipment and explosives
in a daily life-and-death struggle—exacted a price. Some tunnellers
faced reprimands for failing to cope with the incessant strain, deadly
skirmishes, and oppressive darkness. One ultimately deserted from
the front line. But the costly success had been the culmination
of many long years of preparation, training, and strategy for the
Canadians and their allies on the battlefields of northwest Europe.

organisation
Mobile warfare’s misnamed “Race to the Sea” with its outflanking
attempts, ended on the Western Front in mid-October 1914 and
changed the nature of the Great War. Oberstleutnant Otto Füsslein
wrote, “When open warfare reached stalemate and the long front …
solidified … techniques of siege warfare received a new lease of life.
As the enemy could not be attacked on the surface, he was attacked
from under the ground.”3 Military mining’s objective was to pulverise
the enemy’s tunnels, dugouts and trenches by burrowing through
earth, clay, and chalk beneath No Man’s Land. On 15 December
1914, British Major John Norton-Griffiths wrote to the War Office
volunteering to raise a company of tunnellers. Norton-Griffiths
then demonstrated clay-kicking techniques to Lord Kitchener later

3  
Peter Barton, Peter Doyle and Johan Vandewalle, Beneath Flanders Fields: The
Tunnellers’ War 1914-1918, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2004), 26.
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that month.4 His offer was ignored until January 1915, when it was
realized the Germans were engaging in a systematic mining offensive.
In early February, Lord Kitchener demanded 10,000 tunnellers. On
13 February 1915 the Army Council sent Major Norton-Griffiths to
report to Brig.-Gen. Fowke, Engineer-in-Chief at St. Omer, France,
resulting in the War Office’s approval on the 19th for the formation
of nine tunnelling companies.5
In the summer of 1915, the Department of Militia and Defence
of Canada also began organising tunnelling companies to aid the
Royal Engineers (RE). Commencing in September 1915, miners were
recruited in Canada for two such companies. Owing to the urgency
of extensive mining operations, Commander-in-Chief Sir John French
proposed a third Canadian tunnelling company (CTC) in November
1915, created from personnel already serving in the Canadian Corps.6
By the autumn of 1916, thirty-three tunnelling companies were
operating on the Western Front: twenty-five British, three Australian
(earwiggers), three Canadian (beavers), one New Zealander, and the
Australian Electrical and Mechanical Mining and Boring Company
(Alphabet Company)—approximately 30,000 men.7 These tunnelling
companies’ unseen labours—and not often acknowledged—would
become critical to the victories at Vimy Ridge and Messines Ridge.
Major Robert P. Rodgers mobilised the 1st Tunnelling Company,
Canadian Engineers (CE) in Pembroke, Ontario during the autumn
of 1915, with miners recruited from New Brunswick, Nova Scotia,
Quebec, and Ontario. They arrived in France on 16 February 1916.8
Major Cyril B. North became Officer Commanding (OC) in April 1916
and retained command until June 1918.9 Major Robert W. Coulthard
mobilised the 2nd Tunnelling Company, CE in Calgary, Alberta
during December 1915 and January 1916. Miners were recruited from

4  
Tony Bridgland and Anne Morgan, Tunnel-master & Arsonist of the Great War:
The Norton-Griffiths Story, (Barnsley, England: Leo Cooper, 2003), 116.
5  
Barton et al., Beneath Flanders Fields, 59-60; Bridgland and Morgan, Tunnelmaster & Arsonist of the Great War, 123.
6  
Note from Sir John French, 30 November 1915, RG24, Volume 1440, Folder HQ5937-13, Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC].
7  
Phillip Robinson and Nigel Cave, The Underground War: Vimy Ridge to Arras,
(Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 4.
8  
Robert W. Coulthard, “Tunnellers at the Front,” Transactions of the Canadian
Mining Institute XXII (1919), 445.
9  
List of Officers 1st CTC, RG150, Volume 451, LAC.
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Alberta and British Columbia, arriving in France on 10 March 1916.10
Major Lawrence N.B. Bullock served as OC from the summer of
1916 until March 1917, Major Frederick A. Brewster until the end
of 1917, and Major Alan B. Ritchie until July 1918.11 The 1st and
2nd CTCs were disbanded in July 1918 and the tunnellers joined
Canadian engineer battalions. Major Angus W. Davis mobilised the
3rd Tunnelling Company, CE at Ste. Marie-Cappel during November
and December 1915, drawing men from mining sections of the 1st
and 2nd Canadian Divisions.12 Major Alan B. Ritchie became OC
in the summer of 1917 until relinquishing command to Major Arthur
Hibbert late in 1917. Major Hibbert commanded until the end of the
war.13 The company strength was 339 officers and other ranks. With
attached infantry, the total varied from 500 to 800. The company
establishment was authorised on 15 January 1917 to be 569.14
Captain James R. Roaf mobilised the 4th Tunnelling Company, CE
in March 1916 at Nanaimo, British Columbia, but on 24 August 1916,
the Canadian Engineers Training Depot in Bramshott absorbed the
understrength unit of 164 soldiers.
An army Controller of Mines at General Headquarters
coordinated all mining activities in 1916, which were administered by
corps and divisions.15 Nevertheless, the Canadian Corps controlled
all promotions.16 Tunnelling companies were viewed as army troops,
separated from their corps.17 Unlike their RE counterparts, Canadian
tunnellers received no extra pay for their expertise.18
Coulthard, “Tunnellers at the Front,” 445.
List of Officers 2nd CTC, RG150, Volume 451, LAC.
12  
Coulthard, “Tunnellers at the Front,” 445. The 6th Infantry Brigade contributed
78 mining personal.
13  
List of Officers 3rd CTC, RG150, Volume 451, LAC.
14  
RG9, III-D-1, Volume 4711, Folder 96, File 17, LAC. There were two establishments
for RE companies.
15  
In 1918, the 3rd CTC reported directly to Brig.-Gen. W. Bethune Lindsay, Chief
Engineer at Corps HQ. See David W. Love, A Nation In Making Volume 2: The
Organization and Administration of the Canadian Military During the First World
War, (Ottawa: Service Publications, 2012), 272.
16  
R.N. Harvey, Inspector of Mines, 3 March 1917, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4434,
Folder 21, File 11, LAC.
17  
G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1918, (Ottawa: Queen’s
Printer, 1964), 501.
18  
Some Canadian tunnellers believed, incorrectly, that they were entitled to an
extra twenty-five cents per diem. British sapper’s pay, depending on qualifications,
could be more than a shilling a day. See RG24-c-6-b, Volume 1098, File DHS-5-9-10,
LAC.
10  
11  
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underground mining operations
Tunnelling operations were divided into offensive, defensive,
and offensive-defensive mining methods. In some areas, both the
defensive and deeper offensive galleries were in the same vertical
plane. Listening posts were established in lateral galleries dug below
No Man’s Land parallel to the front line. Offensive tactics were
applied for destroying the enemy’s strong points or salient, assisting
in surface attacks on the enemy’s lines, destroying or minimising
hostile underground offensives, combating hostile surface attacks,
and disparaging the morale of the enemy’s rank and file.19
Defensive operations were designed to destroy enemy mining.
From a shaft in a communication trench near the front line, the
gallery—a tunnel running towards the enemy line—would be driven
where enemy mining was expected. A camouflet charge placed against
the face of the tunnel would be blown to destroy an enemy gallery
along with German pionieres (military engineers). This undercharged
defensive mine was designed to wreck galleries without breaking the
earth’s surface, unlike the overcharged offensive mine, which broke
the surface leaving a rimmed crater. In a second defensive technique
a hand auger was used to bore a hole towards the enemy’s gallery
into which a torpedo was fired. This type of camouflet was typically
an 8-foot-long pipe packed with about 100 lb (45 kg) of ammonal.20
In offensive-defensive mining, offensive systems were converted
into defensive positions and vice versa.21 Up until March 1917, the
tunnelling companies’ work was 45 percent offensive mining, 25
percent defensive mining, and 30 percent dugouts.22 Memorandum
“SS 540” issued in November 1915 described the principles of mining
schemes. These directives were translated from a German document.23
The underlying strata of the Western Front can be divided into
two regions. Ypresian clay extends north of Ypres to La Bassée Canal.
Coulthard, “Tunnellers at the Front,” 448; RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4400, Folder 17,
File 2, LAC.
20  
Alexander Barrie, War Underground: The Tunnellers of the Great War, (London:
Tom Donovan Publishing Ltd., 1993), 227.
21  
Coulthard, “Tunnellers at the Front,” 449; Barrie, War Underground, 146.
22  
James E. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1917 Volume II: 7th
June – 10th November, (The Imperial War Museum London and The Battery Press:
Nashville, Tennessee, 1991), 39n.
23  
Instructions for Mine Warfare Tactics, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4434, Folder 21, File
3, LAC.
19  
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From there south to the River Somme, the geology is chalk.24 The
Messines-Wytschaete Ridge (Wijtschatebogen to the German Army)
formed a portion of the Ypres Salient’s southern arc. The ridge is
composed of clay strata (Ypresian clay and Paniselian clay) overlaid
with sand strata—Kemmel sand with trapped water and other sand
layers. Once excavated, the dry blue-grey Ypresian clay oxidises to a
dull brown colour.25
Piling was a method of sinking a vertical shaft into wet or sandy
ground using circular steel shafts called tubbing, the lowest section
having had a cutting edge.26 Timbered shafts were utilised for dry
conditions and all joints were sealed to prevent sand from seeping
through. Deep shafts were sign-boarded as “deep wells.” After
someone fell down one, the Inspector of Mines instructed that all
disused shafts be covered up.27 Galleries, mostly horizontal, had to be
deep enough to pass under the enemy’s defences. A standard gallery
was 4 feet 3 inches high by 2 feet 3 inches wide. For efficient patrolling
of a long offensive gallery, 5 feet by 2 feet 3 inches was recommended,
decreasing to the standard size for the last 300 to 400 feet.28 The
walls, roof, and slightly inclined floors were timbered for added
strength. Occasionally, steel girders reinforced the tunnels, especially
where excessive clay pressure existed. The survey officer attempted
a magnetic bearing to drive the gallery in the correct direction, but
could not achieve it when enclosed with steel timbering.29 Tunnellers
also excavated and constructed deep dugouts and subways, such as
the ones at Vimy Ridge, which allowed infantry safe passage and
could be up to 6 feet 6 inches high by 3 feet 6 inches wide.30

24  
The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-19: Military Mining,
(Uckfield, UK: Naval & Military Press Ltd, 2004), 113. The frontispiece of Barrie’s
War Underground depicts the geological divide near Aubers Ridge.
25  
Barton et al., Beneath Flanders Fields, 76-7.
26  
The Berlin Tunnel at Hill 60, started in 1915, was a long inclined gallery through
a wet and treacherous subsoil. After that all shafts were vertical. See R.N. Harvey,
“Military Mining in the Great War,” The Royal Engineers Journal XLIII (December
1929), 545.
27  
Memorandum from R.N. Harvey 5 July 1917, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4434, Folder
21, File 4, LAC.
28  
Clay Mining Shafts, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4434, Folder 21, File 5, LAC.
29  
Anon, “Some Notes on Surveying for the Deep Offensive Mine Galleries in Front
of the Messines-Wytchaete Ridge,” Tunnellers Old Comrades Association Bulletin
11 (1936), 2.
30  
Infantry subways, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4429, Folder 4, File 15, LAC.
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The Messines galleries’ restrictive dimensions prevented swinging
a pick. Instead, tunnellers used a special type of sharp cross-handled
spade called a grafting tool. There were at least five different shaped
blades.31 Clay-kickers leaned backwards on a cross-shaped piece of
wood, some using sandbags to prop up their backs and heads. They
then kicked the blade’s shoulder or the lateral projection on either
side of the shaft with the full force of their sandbag-wrapped boots.
This was termed “working on the cross.” Bayonets and entrenching
tools were used in sandy ground. Blankets were hung at different
places along the galleries to deaden noise. Flat rubber-tired trolleys
on wooden rails screwed to the gallery floor conveyed hempen
sandbags with dislodged clay (spoil) to the shaft where a handpowered windlass hoisted eight bags of spoil slung on a pulley hook to
the surface. Canadian tunnellers operated a geared windlass, which
could haul up thirty to forty sacks per load. Infantry attached to
the tunnelling company discarded the spoil in distant woods, railway
cuttings, disused trenches, shell craters, dummy breastworks, and
behind the parados. Trolleys transported timber on the trip back to
the face. This tramming proved difficult over swelling floors, as the
clay reacted to moisture introduced by the damp air. In the spring of
1917, the 1st CTC employed an electric Whitaker tunnelling machine
at Lock Hospital on the Ypres-Comines Canal. But the engine would
buck, stall, and only work part of the time.32
Typically a twelve-man team of sappers, speaking in whispers,
worked a six-hour shift. Four were assigned to kicking, timbering,
and bagging; four trolley men to hauling or tramming the spoil to the
shaft; two shaft men to hoisting the sandbags; and two to pumping
out water.33 A sandbag’s hairy fibre occasionally clogged the water
pump valves. Clay-kickers in the 1st CTC sat on the floor three feet
from the face propped up by sandbags at their backs. They threw
the excavated clay over their heads, hopefully without burying the
ventilation hose. Five men working a six-hour shift could drive eight
feet of gallery.34 A tot of rum and a hot meal awaited the 2nd CTC

Types of Grafting Tools, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4434, Folder 21, File 2, LAC.
War Diary [hereafter WD], 1st CTC, April and May 1917, LAC.
33  
Barton et al., Beneath Flanders Fields, 109; Coulthard, “Tunnellers at the Front,”
452-3. Sapper was the lowest rank in the RE and CE.
34  
Robert R. Murray, “Tunnelling in the Ypres Salient,” Annual Journal of the
United Services Institute of Nova Scotia 2 (1929), 119.
31  
32  
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tunnellers after their eight-hour shift.35 Candles secured in bent iron
holders with spikes provided light, acted as a timepiece and presaged a
lack of oxygen when they burnt feebly or went out. Sometimes mining
lamps were retained. Officers and senior non-commissioned officers
(NCOs) carried electric torches when placing a charge and handling
gunpowder, blastine, guncotton, gelignite, and instantaneous fuses.36
Candles were not used once a mine was charged.
The atmosphere in a gallery was so foul that a lit match would
merely glow red at the end. The air was damp and fetid—smelling
of decaying wood and sandbags. Initially, windjammers provided
ventilation using two-inch India rubber hose pipes attached to a
noiseless five-foot blacksmith’s bellows. Later, the Holman Air Pump
and the Keith-Blackman Blower were available whereby armoured
rubber hose carried air to the face.37 Offensive galleries would have
one or more sumps to collect water for pumping. Some floors had a
gradient permitting water to flow back to the shaft’s sump. Shafts with
access ladders and air hoses also incorporated platforms at intervals
with a fixed pump and barrel for water pumped from the bottom.38
Counter-mining posed a constant threat. Contact with the
enemy’s timber was possible, or the floor could collapse into an enemy
gallery. At any minute, a gallery in close proximity could be blown
up. Escape from entombment in such a collapse was improbable. It
was work as usual as long as enemy tapping could be discerned by
a Canadian tunnelller situated in a nearby “rabbit-hole” branch or
gallery listening post. When tunnelling was finished and the mine
was charged, artificial digging noises were often generated to fool
their opponents.
Infantry squatting in a dugout could hear the tapping beneath
them. Once, frogs croaking in a pond at a British brigade headquarters
was thought to be the sound of an enemy boring machine.39 In one
dugout, a large rat’s vibrating nose had been mistaken for the tip of
a German mining drill. The wind blowing over an empty tin or rum

Ernest Russell, “A Private Soldier’s View on the Great War,” MG30-E220, LAC.
Correspondence with Phillip Robinson, 21 September 2016.
37  
Preliminary Tests with Mine Ventilators, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4434, Folder 21,
File 2, LAC. The Holman air pump was used in the Berlin Sap at Hill 60. See WD,
3rd CTC, 2 September 1916, LAC.
38  
Bernard C. Hall, Round the Word in Ninety Years, (self-published, 1981), 60.
39  
W.G. Grieve and B. Newman, Tunnellers: The Story of the Tunnelling Companies,
Royal Engineers, during the World War, (Uckfield, UK: Naval & Military Press), 47.
35  
36  
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jar produced noises presumed to be mining. Coarse humour helped
defuse nerve-wracking conditions.
One-seventy-seven Company … appointed two elderly coal miners,
Sappers Laughton and Bickley, as visiting listeners … chosen mainly
because their hearing was poor… To anxious infantrymen they would
say, “Yes, we hear them. They’re there all right. They seem to be
fornicating.” The hoped-for reply was an astonished, “What—the
Germans?” to which Laughton and Bickley would say, “No—not the
Germans—the rats.”40

Locating and destroying the enemy’s tunnels before he discovered
yours was absolutely vital.41 An inattentive sapper at a listening
post was severely punished.42 In the early days of tunnelling, the
unaided ear detected counter-mining. Listening sticks with a single
vibrating earphone proved ineffectual. The flat, round French Army
pattern water bottle was used. A rubber tube was inserted in the
bottle’s stopper and an ear piece attached to the other end. This
device proved to be reliable, albeit with gained experience.43 The
Canadians in early 1916 used the French-designed 4-inch-diameter
wooden disc geophone—slightly bigger than a puck—containing
two mica discs filled with mercury. The geophone had a nipple to
attach a stethoscope. Only one was needed to magnify sound. A
trained listener could obtain the precise direction of the enemy’s
workings by taking a compass bearing once the sound levels from
two geophones were equal in both ears. This listening device proved
to be extremely sensitive to sound. The listener’s own heart beat had
to be eliminated from the calculations.44 To the untrained listener,
a bluebottle flying across the gallery sounded like a train rushing
forward and then suddenly stopping.45

Barrie, War Underground, 82. At least three other versions of tunnel rat stories
exist.
41  
A.J. Kerry and W.A. McDill, The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian
Engineers, Vol. I 1749-1929, (Ottawa: The Military Engineers Associations of
Canada, 1962), 124.
42  
Coulthard, “Tunnellers at the Front,” 454.
43  
Grieve and Newman, Tunnellers, 48.
44  
Synton, Tunnellers All, 58.
45  
Hall, Round the World in Ninety Years, 67.
40  
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Electric seismo-microphones in listening posts and gassy galleries
were linked up to a central listening station and were effective as long
as shells and rats did not cut the wires.46 Australian tunnellers at
the Bluff would catch rats and tie little bells around their necks with
string. The rats were then released in the direction of the German
lines, scurrying speedily through the subterranean routes.47

mine explosives
At the beginning of the war black powder packed in 100-lb sacks and
guncotton in slabs of a few pounds were used in mining operations.
Other explosives included amatol, blastine, sabulite, ammonal,
cheddite, and gelignite. Ammonal superseded gunpowder; it was
easier to handle, safer since it could not be detonated by a bullet
or flame and had three-and-a-half times the lifting power. It was
composed of 65 percent ammonium nitrate, 15 percent TNT, 3
percent charcoal, 16 percent course aluminium, and 1 percent fine
aluminium.48 An ammonal charge was stored either in 50-lb tins
or 25-lb to 40-lb rubberised canvas bags clamped with wood slats.
Water-proof rubberised bags were necessary because ammonal was
very deliquescent and liable to fail after 10 percent moisture or less
if not powerfully detonated. A detonator was triggered electrically
(exploder or dynamo), by fuse or by cordeau détonant. The detonator
fired a primer, which in turn fired the charge. Fulminate mercury
detonator tubes were inserted into the guncotton primers.49 German
miners used westphalite—one of the safest explosives to work with—
placed in 20-kg metal boxes.50
In early 1916, the 3rd CTC used a German-made Siemens Halske electric sound
detector. The American Western Electric sound detector was also used. The
Germans operated the Edelmann apparatus, a switchboard for six microphones, and
the Moritz listening station to intercept Allied telephone calls. See The Microphone
Applied to Listening in Mines, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 4429, Folder 5, File 13, LAC;
Mining Operations at Hill 60, RG24-C-6-e, Volume 1834, GAQ-8-42, LAC.
47  
Damien Finlayson, Crumps and Camouflets: Australian Tunnelling Companies on
the Western Front, (NewPort, Australia: Big Sky Publishing, 2010), 164.
48  
Grieve and Newman, Tunnellers, 42; RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4434, Folder 21, File
2, LAC; Angus W. Davis, “Tunnelling Reminiscences,” Transactions of the Canadian
Mining Institute XXII (1919), 476.
49  
Correspondence with Phillip Robinson, 11 January 2017.
50  
L.B. Reynolds, “Mining in Chalk on Western Front,” Transactions of the Canadian
Mining Institute XXII (1919), 473.
46  
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A charge, such as a camouflet, intended to destroy an enemy
gallery was tamped by placing sandbags behind the charge. Tamping
prevented the explosion from flowing down the gallery instead of
through the strata above the charge. The explosion released carbon
monoxide (CO) gas, which remained bottled up and trapped in the
gallery.51 Air spaces between piles of sandbags acted as pneumatic
cushions, reducing the shock of the explosion. For example, 15 feet of
tamping, a 10-foot air space, 10 feet of tamping, and another 10-foot
air space sufficed for a 50-foot mine depth.52
A blown camouflet could kill trapped tunnellers either by the
explosion’s concussion or the ensuing odourless chokedamp—the coal
miner’s term for CO.53 Prolonged exposure produced breathlessness,
headaches, and then vomiting and retching. A large amount of CO
could cause unconsciousness in minutes.54 For the assault on the
Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, the infantry was advised that crater
bottoms were dangerous owing to the possibility of the gas collecting
there. Troops were to stay well up on the rims.55 To counter CO
effects, anti-gas breathing apparatus called Proto sets—in use at
mine rescue stations at British coalfields—were utilised along with
the Salvus breathing apparatus.56
The 32-lb self-contained Proto set included two oxygen cylinders
and a breathing bag containing caustic soda sticks—a carbon dioxide
absorbent for exhaled air.57 Wearing a Proto set, the average tunneller
could work only fifteen or twenty minutes without a break, whereas
a strong individual might work for thirty minutes. The air became
too hot to work comfortably after thirty minutes. Two fully charged
cylinders could last up to two hours of moderate work. The 17-lb onecylinder Salvus could also last up to half an hour before the air became
too hot. The contents were depleted more quickly with strenuous work.

The detonation of high explosives produced carbon monoxide. See The Work of
the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-19, 60; S.S. 534 Defence Against
Gas, March 1918, 6.
52  
Grieve and Newman, Tunnellers, 43; Reynolds, “Mining in Chalk on Western
Front,” 472.
53  
Alexander Turner, Messines 1917: The zenith of siege warfare, (Oxford: Osprey
Publishing, 2010), 26.
54  
Barrie, War Underground, 102; Barton et al., Beneath Flanders Fields, 126.
55  
Summary of Disposition of 3rd Tunnelling Company, Canadian Engineers During
Operations, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4434, Folder 21, File 12, LAC.
56  
Grieve and Newman, Tunnellers, 59.
57  
The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-19, 62.
51  
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Both Proto and Salvus apparatus were installed at life-saving stations
along with Novita Pattern oxygen reviving sets. Every company had
proto-men trained in the operation of breathing apparatus and in
resuscitation techniques. Two proto-men were assigned to each trench
where mines were set to be blown by Canadian tunnellers on 7 June
1917.58 Tunnelling companies were reminded that box respirators did
not afford protection against mine or explosive gases.59 At 11 p.m. on
14 February 1917, a fire broke out in the 2nd CTC’s dugout system.
An officer—wearing a Salvus mouthpiece, noseclip, and goggles—
was mistaken for a German by newly-arrived reinforcements who
attempted to stick him with their bayonets.60
If a mine’s atmosphere was suspected of being dangerous, an
officer or NCO wearing a Proto or Salvus set took caged mice or
canaries along with his air-tight electric flash-lamp. Both mice
and canaries have high metabolic rates and show symptoms of CO
poisoning in only two minutes, whereas a person might not be affected
for thirty minutes.61 A distressed canary would sway, take flight, and
fall to the cage bottom. A canary’s claws were regularly trimmed
to ensure it could not grip its perch, but instead plunge downwards
when overcome.62

messines ridge operation
In May 1915, Norton-Griffiths believed a large-scale mining operation
on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge could blow the Germans off it. A
diagram “of an arc like a large Capital C with three crosses for St.
Eloi, Wytschaete and Messines in line to the right of it” illustrated
his proposed plan.63 Places on the arc included Hollandscheschuur,
Petit Bois, Meadelstede Farm, Peckham Farm, Spanbroekmolen,
Kruisstraat, Ontario Farm, and La Petite Douve Farm. The arc was
Hall, Round the World in Ninety Years, 60; Robinson and Cave, The Underground
War, 9; Summary of Disposition, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4434, Folder 21, File 12,
LAC.
59  
S.S. 534 Defence Against Gas, March 1918, 25.
60  
Report of Fire on Mount Sorrell [sic], RG24-C-6-e, Volume 1834, GAQ-8-44, LAC.
Eleven men died although the unofficial report claimed forty-eight had perished.
61  
The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-19, 67.
62  
Simon Jones, Underground Warfare 1914-1918, (Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword
Military, 2010), 182; Barton et al., Beneath Flanders Fields, 131.
63  
Barrie, War Underground, 89.
58  
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later expanded north to Hill 60 and south to Ploegsteert Wood. Early
in 1916, British Commander-in-Chief Sir Douglas Haig believed that
the capture of the ridge was a prerequisite to clearing the enemy
from the high ground east of Ypres and freeing the Belgian coast. At
a conference in May 1917, Haig split the operation into two phases,
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having the Northern Operation occur some weeks after the capture
of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge.64
Eventually twenty-five Messines mines were charged, although
one mine was lost to nature and one to enemy countermining. The
chamber at “A” gallery under Peckham Farm near Wytschaete
was charged with 87,000 lb (39,462 kg) of mostly ammonal in June
1916. “C” gallery with 20,000 lb (9,071 kg) of explosive stacked in
several chambers was abandoned when the gallery collapsed after the
electric pumps broke down. By August 1916, a 50,000 lb (22,679 kg)
charge had been placed in La Petite Douve Farm’s main drive. But
enemy voices were detected so a small camouflet was blown, killing
nine pionieres in an adjacent gallery. The Germans retaliated by
blowing a 6,000 lb (2,721 kg) camouflet, which killed four British
tunnellers and shattered the main gallery beyond repair—the charge
was abandoned.65
The sector east of Ploegsteert Wood between St. Yves and Le
Gheer had been nicknamed the Birdcage, attributed to the heavy
barbed wire fortifications the British had installed after losing
trenches there to German assaults in November 1914.66 Three shafts,
M1, M3, and M4, were sunk near a dugout at Trench 121. Three
charges were placed off shaft M1 and a fourth charge off shaft M3,
all under the Birdcage. This cluster of four mines—with a combined
charge of 112,000 lb (50,802 kg)—was completed by spring 1916.
(See Appendix, Table 1) However, General Plumer thought that
the Birdcage mines were not close enough to the attack zone to
have the intended impact.67 On 24 May 1917, the 3rd Australian
Divisional headquarters issued an order not to blow the Birdcage
mines. Consequently, the mines were held in reserve and the galleries
were reinforced with struts to withstand the shock from the adjacent
mines.68 On 7 June 1917, nineteen charged mines were detonated.
(See Appendix, Table 2)

Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 301.
Phillip Robinson, “The Abandoned Messines Mines,” 2-6; Grieve and Newman,
Tunnellers, 226-7, 233-4; Jones, Underground Warfare 1914-1918, 151, 154.
66  
Tony Spagnoly and Ted Smith, Cameos of the Western Front: Salient Points Five
Ypres Sector 1914-1918, (Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), 27-30.
67  
Ian Passingham, Pillars of Fire: The Battle of Messines Ridge June 1917,
(Gloucestershire, UK: Spellmount, 2012), 68.
68  
RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4434, Folder 21, File 12, LAC; WD, 3rd CTC, 27 May 1917,
LAC.
64  
65  
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canadian tunnellers at messines ridge
In March 1916, the 1st CTC replaced the 182nd Tunnelling Company,
RE at Armentières. In early May, two sections moved to the St. Eloi
front where the 172nd Tunnelling Company, RE had blown six mines
on 27 March. By the end of May 1916, the two remaining sections of
Canadians were prepared to take over the work at the Bluff—a large
30-foot-high mound of spoil—midway between St. Eloi and Hill 60.
At the beginning of June, a new steel shaft was started at the Bluff
to combat the enemy’s complete system of galleries. In July, a gallery
was driven out from the shaft at a depth of 90 feet. On the evening
of 25 July, a German mine destroyed about 150 feet of tunnel, the
explosion forming a crater.69 By September, two defensive galleries
at the Bluff and the Ravine were underway, driven approximately
1,300 feet and 500 feet respectively by year’s end.
The 1st CTC tunnellers worked in short shifts—one hour working
and one hour listening for enemy activity. The listeners equipped
themselves with sawed-off rifles. On 11 December, a camouflet of four
charges totalling 10,070 lb (4,568 kg) was blown opposite the Bluff,
leading to the capture of 700 feet of intact enemy gallery.70 At the
end of January 1917, after the 2nd Australian Tunnelling Company
relieved the 1st CTC’s two sections at the Bluff, the Canadians
moved to Lock Hospital on the other side of the canal. They sank
two shafts 130 feet down and drove a gallery 600 feet.
At St. Eloi a new shaft called Queen Victoria was started on 17
August 1916 and completed by 5 September. The gallery’s explosives
chamber was under 5 feet of Campinian (Alluvial) sand, 20 feet of
Sandy clay, 23 feet of damp Paniselian clay, and 77 feet of Ypresian
blue clay. About 1700 cubic yards of spoil were hauled away in
75,000 sandbags. On 21 May 1917, the tunnellers finished loading the
explosives.
The 1st CTC had laid the biggest charge of the war—95,300 lb
(43,227 kg) of ammonal and 300 lb (136 kg) of gelignite packed into
1,912 50-lb tins—in a chamber 1,340 feet from the shaft along a

Mining Operations at the Bluff, May-December 1916, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4427,
Folder 1, File 15, LAC.
70  
RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3962, Folder 24, File 4, LAC.
69  
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1,640-foot-long gallery.71 Wiring, bracing, and tamping were finished
on 25 May at St. Eloi. Thirty feet of sandbags sealed the chamber
with 150 feet of sandbags along the gallery. Eleven series of 30 feet
of sandbags with 10-foot air spaces plus two 5-foot seals, for a total
length of 600 feet, completed the tamping.72 The leads from the
three exploders had been tested with very low amperage by noon
on 6 June. The Canadian gallery had succeeded in bypassing the
German’s elaborate defensive galleries.73
While the 1st CTC concentrated on offensive mining, the 2nd
CTC was engaged in defensive work: dugouts at the Bluff and mining
at Mount Sorrel, Tor Top (Hill 62), Armagh Wood, Observatory
Ridge, and the Lille Gate from the spring of 1916 until the Battle of
Messines. A defensive lateral system with many listening posts and a
1,700-foot defensive gallery near Trench 49, facing Mount Sorrel, were
constructed. On the morning of 2 June 1916, the Germans bombarded
Mount Sorrel, Armagh Wood, and Sanctuary Wood for nearly fourand-a-half hours. The 4th CMR’s Lt.-Col. John F.H. Ussher took
shelter with some of his men, along with about fifty tunnellers, in a
60-foot-long shallow tunnel with one exit at the Tube—a 15-foot-deep
shelter trench—and a second at the O’Grady Walk communication
trench. Both exits collapsed. XIII Corps (Württemberg) assault troops
captured the Canadians as they emerged after two hours of digging.
More tunnellers were captured in shallow defensive galleries south of
the Tube in front of Trenches 48 and 49 as well as at the 49-footlong gallery near Clonmel Copse, northeast of these trenches. Of the
ninety-five tunneller casualties, sixty-five were captured, twenty-two
were killed or died from wounds, and eight were wounded.74 The 1st
Canadian Division recaptured the sector on 13 June.
The 3rd CTC went into the line near Wulverghem in January 1916.
They replaced the 182nd Tunnelling Company, RE at Kruisstraat
Cabaret mine on the 16th. The shaft was extended another 26 feet to
Details of charge and electric exploding apparatus, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4427,
Folder 2, File 1, LAC.
72  
Tamping at Queen Victoria, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4427, Folder 2, File 1, LAC;
Grieve and Newman, Tunnellers, 214-6.
73  
WD, 1st CTC, March 1916 to June 1917, LAC; Jones, Underground Warfare, 147.
74  
J. Castell Hopkins, Canada at War: A Record of Heroism and Achievement
1914-1918, (Toronto: The Canadian Annual Review Limited, 1919), 145-7; Daily
Orders, RG150, Volume 256, 1, LAC; Lt.-Col. Ussher, MG30-E376, LAC; WD, 2nd
CTC, June 1916 Appendix B, LAC; Report on Operations June 1st-4th, 1916, RG9,
III-C-3, Volume 4162, Folder 9, File 5, LAC.
71  
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a depth of 66 feet. On the 20th, the 250th Tunnelling Company, RE
handed over Spanbroekmolen with a 90-foot-long main gallery. The
Canadians had driven more than 800 feet of gallery in both locations
by the end of March, when they handed the work to the 175th
Tunnelling Company, RE. The 3rd CTC started a tubbed shaft (Q1)
for the La Petite Douve Farm mine in Trench 134 north of the River
Douve in March 1916. The 171st Tunnelling Company, RE replaced
them and eventually drove a gallery to La Petite Douve Farm.
Early in April, the 3rd CTC moved to Hill 60, taking over the
Berlin Tunnel complex from the 175th Tunnelling Company, RE. Hill
60 was one of the most dangerous mining operations with countermines exploding almost every week.75 Mines were at three levels:
shallow (about 20 feet), middle for defensive mining, and deep for
offensive mining. Acetylene lamps were used instead of candles
in the damp environment along with electric mine lamps to save
air. Two main offensive inclined galleries were forked off the Berlin
Tunnel—“A” for Hill 60, 90 feet deep into Paniselian clay, and “B”
for the Caterpillar spoil heap at 100 feet deep. By 1 August, 45,700
lb (20,729 kg) of ammonal and 7,800 lb (3,538 kg) of guncotton had
been loaded at Hill 60’s three charge chambers. Then the Berlin
Tunnel flooded in September. The Canadian tunnellers installed a
centrifugal pump to drain the water. Sixty men worked full time on
hand pumps to control the water inflows from the sand.76 “D” gallery
was begun in August to protect the mines. Fifteen hundred tightly
sealed tins of ammonal (70,000 lb/31,751 kg) were packed, detonators
placed between the tins, and 630 feet of tamping, the same as Hill 60,
were completed at the Caterpillar’s six charge chambers at the end
of a 1,380-foot-long gallery on 18 October.77 Before they left Hill 60,
work began on the Berlin Shaft, which was needed to replace the old
timbered inclined shaft.
The exhausted tunnellers, many with sepsis, needed a rest from
the mining, repeated counterblows, and dangerous living conditions

Roger Clarke, “History of Mining at Hill 60,” MG30-E155, LAC.
Finlayson, Crumps and Camouflets, 135.
77  
Four-gallon petrol tins were utilised for wet chambers at Hill 60, the Caterpillar
and Kruisstraat No. 3. See Franky Bostyn, “Zero Hour: Historical Note on the
British Underground War in Flanders, 1915-1917,” in Fields of Battle: Terrain in
Military History, ed. by P. Doyle and M. R. Bennett, (Dordrecht, Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 226, 235n.
75  
76  
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on the hill.78 On 8 November, the 3rd CTC left Hill 60 and moved
south to Ploegsteert Wood, exchanging headquarters with the 1st
Australian Tunnelling Company. The Australian official historian
Charles Bean documented “… ’very fine counter-mining work carried
out under very difficult conditions’ by the Canadians. … after seven
months of extraordinarily gallant and clever mining, [at Hill 60]
…”79 The charges from Trenches 122 and 127—located northeast of
Ploegsteert Wood—had been completed by June 1916. A new incline
was dug by the Canadians for Trench 122. In addition to cleanup,
pumping, and repairs in Trenches 121, 122, and 123 new offensive
work began immediately at Trench 131 to excavate Seaforth Farm
to a depth of 120 feet. A new steel shaft was started for Trench 127.
The Russian saps at Trench 123 were braced with timber to resist the
blows from Trenches 122 and 127.80 Typically, these saps were shallow
underground galleries, which could be converted into trenches by
breaking open the ceiling.
Lieut. George H. Dickson and Lieut. (later captain) Bernard
C. Hall, along with fourteen other ranks (OR) were responsible for
blowing the two mines originating from Trench 122—Ultimo and
Factory Farm, a fortified strongpoint. Dickson developed the flu
and had been exposed to gas. Therefore, Sergeant Leonard T. Beer
took his place at the exploder’s handle for Ultimo. Lieut. George H.
Hambly and six OR were tasked with pulling down the horizontal
braces in the Russian saps at Trench 123 and to break through to
the surface. Lieut. Harold C. Garner, Lieut. John J. Hanna, and
ten OR were responsible for blowing the two mines at Trench 127.
Proto-men were also assigned to the mined galleries.81 Trench 122’s
charges were the final ones to be wired owing to last minute orders
on 6 June to extend the leads from the bottom of the 70-foot shaft up
to the trench. Fifteen OR were assigned to Trench 121, with its four
charged mines, at Birdcage.
According to Hall, “Jaundice, boils and tetanus were rife.” See Barton et al.,
Beneath Flanders Fields, 168.
79  
C.E.W. Bean, The Australian Imperial Force in France 1917, Volume IV, 13th
Edition, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson Limited, 1943), 951.
80  
WD, 3rd CTC, January 1916 – June 1917, LAC; Jones, Underground Warfare,
145-152; Grieve and Newman, Tunnellers, 211, 227-236; Report of the Work of the
Canadian Tunnelling Companies in the Second Army, RG9, III-D-1, Volume 4709,
Folder 94, File 5, LAC.
81  
Summary of Disposition of 3rd Tunnelling Company CE during Operations, RG9,
III-C-5, Volume 4434, Folder 21, File 12, LAC.
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zero-hour and aftermath
It was essential that the nineteen mines be fired at zero-hour, at which
time the artillery barrage would open fire and the infantry begin to
advance. Infantry brigades were informed that if a mine had not been
blown by ten seconds after zero, the mine would not be blown at all.
One important reason for blowing all mines at zero was to prevent
the Germans from occupying a crater before the assaulting infantry
could capture the ground.82 The objective of the II Anzac Corps—the
25th Division, the New Zealand Division, the 3rd, and 4th Australian
Divisions—was the southern shoulder of the ridge, which included
Messines, the Douve Valley, and the St. Yves area.83 Standard time
was received at II Anzac Corps Headquarters by wireless from the
Eiffel Tower. This time was then telegraphed to divisions, artillery,
and the RFC. Lower units were prohibited from receiving the time
by telephone; coded messages were sent by runners.84
Hall and Dickson, assigned to blowing the mines at Trench
122, were to synchronise their watches with the Infantry officer
commanding the assembled troops, who would attack over the areas
impacted by the mines.85 Garner and Hanna did the same for Trench
127. Captain Harry R. Urie was informed about zero-hour at 12:50
p.m. on 6 June. Hall, in his autobiography, records that on that day,
Urie handed him a watch with zero-hour for Trench 122 set at 3:10
a.m., plus a correction factor of thirteen seconds because the watch
was fast.
However, the mines did not detonate simultaneously. The New
Zealand official history states, “Within a few seconds of the proper
time the mines were sprung from Factory Farm, [Trench 122] …
and at Anton’s Farm Road, [Trench 127] …” The Australian official
history records a seven-second premature firing, which briefly
panicked some of the Australian soldiers who mistook it for an

The Germans had beaten the British to the crater at Hawthorn Ridge on 1 July
1916.
83  
Passingham, Pillars of Fire, 108-9.
84  
3rd Australian Division, 3 June 1917, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4434, Folder 21, File
12, LAC; Synchronisation of Watches “B,” 6 June 1917, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4434,
Folder 21, File 12, LAC.
85  
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enemy mine.86 At St. Eloi, three exploder handles were pushed down
after Capt. Stuart Thorne gave the word “go.” Hall in Trench 122
is quoted as saying, “had to count those thirteen seconds after 3.10.
… When the watch came round I said ‘DOWN!’ …”87 There is no
mention of a seven second slip-up and no admission of premature
timing in Hall’s autobiography. Was Hall’s synchronised watch from
Urie inaccurate or unreliable, or had Hall—perhaps through misty
gasmask eyepieces—pressed the T-bar plunger too soon?
The British official history documents a nineteen-second interval
between the first and last mine explosions.88 An extract from Major
R.S.G. Stokes’ war diary records, “At about 03-9.30 Peckham
was fired; 20 seconds later, Spanbroekmolen, and 2 seconds later,
Kruistraat [sic].”89 Brig.-Gen. R.N. Harvey witnessed the explosions
from a dugout at Mont Kemmel and recorded thirty seconds as the
time from the first to last mine explosions. The Australian official
historian claimed a period of twenty seconds.90 The two Petit Bois
mines were allegedly blown twelve seconds late, causing a number of
49th Brigade troops to be blown off their feet. Jones described the
same outcome when Spanbroekmolen was purportedly fired fifteen
seconds late.91 If true, this late firing blatantly ignored the decree
prohibiting blowing mines no more than ten seconds after zero-hour.
The official nineteen second interval is plausible assuming the
first mine was fired seven seconds early and the last mine fired
twelve seconds late. Eyewitness accounts vary in the timing they
report. Lieut. Bryan Frayling, an RE tunnelling officer, observed the
explosions while in the open, near the forward observation points for
generals and war correspondents at Mont Kemmel. He was about two
miles west of the Spanbroekmolen mine, near the midpoint of the arc
of mines. Frayling believed he witnessed all nineteen explosions, but
found it impossible to check his watch’s second hand while registering
the separate explosions. Spanbroekmolen blew, followed immediately
Hugh Stewart, The New Zealand Division 1916-1919: A Popular History Based
on Official Records, (Auckland, NZ: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1921), 185; Bean, The
Australian Imperial Force in France 1917, 593.
87  
Barton et al., Beneath Flanders Fields, 188.
88  
Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1917 Volume II, 59n.
89  
Barton et al., Beneath Flanders Fields, 188.
90  
The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-19, 40-1; R.N.
Harvey, “British Military Mining, 1915-1917,” The Military Engineer XXIII No. 132
(1931), 515; Bean, The Australian Imperial Force in France 1917, 593.
91  
Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1917 Volume II, 58-9.
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by the Kruisstraat mines. Ten or twelve mines to the north and south
went up while he was watching the closest eruptions. A fellow officer
confirmed the last of the mines to go up was Ontario Farm.92
Major Stokes, in a support line, claimed that fumes screened the
visual spectacles from all but the nearest mines. Consequently, it is
impossible to ascertain the precise time frame of mine explosions on 7
June 1917. A period of about thirty seconds is possible. Eyewitnesses
may have been distracted and confused by the sounds and shock of
battle pandemonium: massive mines detonating, secondary explosions
and minor after-flashes from the main eruptions, and the thunderous
artillery barrage.
The nine infantry divisions did not suffer major casualties from
the staggered mine eruptions. The artillery’s drum-fire from 2,266
guns and howitzers and 700 machine guns opened a barrage along
the 17,000 yard (15.5 km) front on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge,
already earthquaking from the force of 933,200 lb (423,293 kg) of
explosives.93 That was the signal for the seventy-six Mark IV tanks
and the first waves of 80,000 troops to storm, conquer, and occupy the
ridge. Some infantrymen lost their sense of direction in the miasma
or collapsed from the repercussion of the blasts and others strayed
from their units while detouring around the tortured landscape of
gas-filled craters and shell holes.
At zero-hour the men were lying out in the assembly trenches
extending into No Man’s Land. No one had been allowed to penetrate
the 200-yard danger zone in front of the mines. Sapper Jack Martin
was posted to the 122nd Brigade, 41st (Imperial) Division near St.
Eloi on the night of 6 June 1917. “For several minutes the earth rocked
to and fro oscillating quite twelve inches. … It was stupendous beyond
the imagination.” Füsilier Paul Schumacher, 12th Company Fusilier
Regiment 33 writes, “Then suddenly there was an enormous flash,
just where we had come from, to the right by St Eloi and to the left
at Messines. Blood-red flames shot up into the sky and a dull crack

Bryan Frayling, “Tunnellers,” The Royal Engineers Journal 102 (1988), 173-4. He
was interviewed in 1964.
93  
In May, the Canadian Corps transferred heavy batteries, siege batteries, and
field artillery to the Second Army operations at Messines. See Douglas E. Delaney,
“Introduction,” in Capturing Hill 70: Canada’s Forgotten Battle of the First World
War, ed. by Douglas E. Delaney and Serge Marc Durflinger, (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2016), 11; WD, Canadian Corps GS, May 1917, Appendix 1/4, RG9, III-D-3, Volume
4812, Reel T-7176, LAC.
92  
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Royal Engineers plan diagram of a mine at St. Eloi. [The Work of the Royal Engineers in the
European War, 1914-19: Military Mining (Chatham: Institute of Royal Engineers, 1922)]

and boom penetrated the roar of the guns. The earth heaved and
rocked as though it was trying to tear itself apart.”94 Private Norman
Gladden of the 11th Northumberland Fusiliers, 23rd (Imperial)
Division was near Hill 60. “The ground began to rock. My body was
carried up and down as though by the waves of the sea. In front the
earth opened and a large black mass mounted on pillars of fire to the

Jack Martin, Sapper Martin: The Secret Great War Diary of Jack Martin, ed. by
Richard van Emden, (London: Blumsbury Publishing, 2009), 71; Jack Sheldon, The
German Army at Passchendaele, (Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword Military, 2007),
16.
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sky, where it seemed to remain suspended for some seconds while the
awful red glow lit up the surrounding desolation.” Reserve Leutnant
Freiherr Kreß von Kressenstein, 2nd Company Infantry Regiment
413 had been lying down for a short rest. “A massive earthquake,
coupled with a thunderous noise from underground, brought me back
to my feet. On Hill 60/59 a huge pillar of fire, a good hundred metres
high, had shot into the sky.”95 Lieut. A. G. May led his machine gun
team into battle from a position opposite Wytschaete. “Not far in
advance of our front parapet I saw a couple of our lads who had gone
completely goofy, perhaps from the concussion. It was pitiful, one of
them welcomed me like a long lost friend and asked me to give him
his baby.”96
The Messines-Wytschaete Ridge was obliterated. Almost 700
Germans had been killed at the Hill 60 and Caterpillar craters. Enemy
dead were later found, standing, in crushed trenches. Concussion
had killed others. “The effect on the [204th German Division at Hill
60] troops was overpowering and crushing … the trenches were now
the graves of our infantry.”97 Another 400 were dead at St. Eloi. A
shockwave had killed German officers near Spanbroekmolen. Veteran
German soldiers staggered drunkenly, some crawled on hands and
knees. Near Ontario Farm, half of two Bavarian battalions were
wiped out. The mine blasts had annihilated whole companies.
Massive concrete dugouts tossed skywards now entombed twenty to
thirty German corpses.98 Between 1-10 June, 7,548 front-line German
soldiers went missing—some completely buried and others vapourised
by intense heat—as a result of the mines and the crushing artillery.99
British war correspondent Philip Gibbs witnessed the eruptions
from his observation point at Mont Kemmel. His despatch to the
Daily Sketch and Daily Chronicle reported “By my side to-day, [11
June] as I looked down into this pit of hell, [St. Eloi] stood a man
who had worked for a year in the making of it—an Australian officer
of engineers.” Two days earlier, Gibbs had informed his readers that
British, Australian, and New Zealander tunnellers had carried out the
Norman Gladden, Ypres 1917: A Personal Account, (Abingdon, England: Purnell
Book Services Limited, 1967), 61; Sheldon, The German Army at Passchendaele, 26.
96  
Malcolm Brown, The Imperial War Museum Book of the Western Front, (London:
Sidgwick & Jackson, 1993), 173.
97  
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Messines mining.100 Lieut. Edward McCammon, who served in the
1st CTC, sent a three-page typewritten letter to Lord Beaverbrook
complaining that Gibbs had not mentioned that Canadian tunnellers
had performed the mining at St. Eloi.101 Gibbs may have assumed
there were no Canadian tunnellers since the Canadian Corps had
not fought at Messines. McCammon—a Canadian journalist before
enlisting—may have had an ulterior motive for writing Beaverbrook
who was in charge of the Canadian War Records Office.
The Birdcage mines, which had been held in reserve, were
inspected by Hall for any Factory Farm damage. He climbed down
to the bottom of one shaft, probably M4 at Trench 121, where he
tested the leads and workings, finding them satisfactory. Major H.R.
Dixon writes “For the rest of that year and well into 1918, we were in
correspondence with the Belgium [sic] Government over the question
of the removal of these mines.”102 But the German spring offensive of
1918 recaptured the lost ground, leaving the four Birdcage mines with
112,000 lb (50,802 kg) of explosive untouched.
On the morning after the Messines explosions the twelve [German]
geologists and, it is believed, Lieut.-Colonel Füsslein [Commander of
the Tunnellers], were lined up in the [Lille] Museum, a German general
arrived, cursed them freely for failing to warn him of the mining
possibilities on the British side, and ordered those under 40 to join
regiments at the front, and those over 40 to go back to their wives.103

psychological impacts of underground warfare
The psychological trauma experienced by the German defenders
overshadowed the mine casualties. “What is clear is that the physical
destruction wrought by the mines was of secondary importance to
the profound and widespread effect on German cohesion.”104 General

100  
Philip Gibbs, From Bapaume To Passchendaele 1917, (Toronto: William Biggs,
1918), 174, 166.
101  
McCammon Letter, 20 June 1017, RG9, III-D-1, Volume 4709, Folder 94, File
5, LAC.
102  
Robinson, “The Abandoned Messines Mines,” 8.
103  
Anon, “The Messines Ridge Mines, 7th June, 1917, German Accounts,” The
Royal Engineers Journal LIV (September 1940), 353.
104  
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Ludendorff conceded defeat due to the exceptionally powerful mines,
acknowledging the overwhelming impact of shell shock on the
surviving Messines Ridge defenders.105 “The fact that, unintentionally,
the explosions were not all simultaneous … had a cumulative effect on
the German garrison, and their panic was further increased by the …
ventriloquial character of great explosions. The demoralizing effect did,
in fact, far exceed expectations …”106 There was nowhere to run and
hide. Advancing British troops encountered the enemy cowering. In a
stupefied state, many surrendered without resistance. One Australian
battalion found the local German garrison “entirely unstrung.”107
Many tunnellers, drained and cantankerous from the life-threatening
mining environment, flouted military discipline. Others despaired—
tormented by their harrowing experiences—as their courage drained
away. The 3rd CTC suffered severely from the strain of the trying
conditions. More than ninety Field Punishment No. 1 sentences were
handed out in 1916 to sappers and privates in the 3rd CTC.108
Sapper Joseph Bromley, regimental number 53547, disobeyed
Army regulations in England and in the field. He forfeited one
day’s pay for being absent without leave in August 1915. For being
drunk on active service, he was sentenced to twenty-eight days Field
Punishment No. 1 in December 1915.109 On 28 November 1916, he
was put under open arrest, according to Captain Urie, after he “…
got too familiar with the [stolen] jug containing the rum issue in the
dugouts at the mine at Trench 123.”110 The war diary records that
sometime between 8 and 9 p.m. on 28 November, twenty-one-year-old
Bromley deserted and went over to the enemy. The Daily Orders for
31 December acknowledged Bromley’s desertion by logging: Absent
without leave 28/11/16. (Auth: … 8/12/16).111 Bromley certainly
possessed considerable information. But had he spilled the beans to

105  
See General Eric Ludendorff, My War Memories 1914-1918 Vol. II, (London:
Hutchison & Co, 1919), 428-9.
106  
Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1917 Volume II, 55.
107  
Bean, The Australian Imperial Force in France 1917, 593.
108  
3rd CTC Daily Orders Part II, RG150, Volumes 256 and 257, LAC.
109  
Joseph Bromley, service file, RG150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 1096-1, LAC.
110  
Barton et al., Beneath Flanders Fields, 182.
111  
Ashley Ekins argues that desertion is one of the “chronic symptoms of
disintegration.” See Ashley Ekins, “Fighting to exhaustion: Morale, discipline and
combat effectiveness in the armies of 1918,” in 1918 Year of Victory: The end of
the Great War and the shaping of history, ed. by Ashely Ekins, (Auckland: Exisle,
2010), 111.
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the enemy? Did they act on it?112 The war diary for 20 December
records that the enemy had concentrated shelling on trenches 122 and
123 after Bromley had deserted. Urie recounted that the Germans
launched a raid after saturating the area with shelling, inflicting
infantry casualties.113
Upon returning to Canada, he was admitted to hospital where
he claimed to have been wounded by a bomb and taken prisoner at
Armentières on 28 November 1916.114 He had been hospitalised with
wounds to his right hand and leg from a grenade according to his
German POW file.115 He was approved for a war service gratuity even
though soldiers were not to be paid if they had contributed to their
own captivity by cowardice or neglect. Therefore, he was either not
interviewed or not rigorously interrogated during the twenty-fourhour repatriation process at the reception centre in Ripon.116 Bromley
moved to Detroit upon demobilisation. He was awarded the Victory
Medal and the British War Medal. The latter was returned in July
1921. Bromley died August 1962 in Windsor Ontario and his widow
received a pension.117
Private (later lieutenant) John Westacott of the 19th Canadian
Battalion was attached for temporary duty to the 2nd CTC on 9
May 1916. His service file—corroborated by the 3rd CTC’s war
diary—records that he was temporarily assigned to the 3rd CTC
at Hill 60 from 8 June to 21 June.118 However, according to Barrie’s
War Underground, Westacott fought the enemy underground on 13
June at Mount Sorrel, blowing camouflets and killing Germans. But
these exploits are not recorded in the 2nd CTC’s war diary, and its
June 1916 “Casualties By Day-France and Belgium” sheet reveals
German intelligence officers never looked upon deserters favourably. They most
likely regarded the prisoner with suspicion and distaste. See Aaron Pegram, “The
Most Valuable Sources of News,” Stand To! 106 (2016), 29.
113  
Barton et al., Beneath Flanders Fields, 182; Barrie, War Underground, 244. The
raid occurred on 23 December.
114  
Joseph Bromley, service file, LAC.
115  
Red Cross Archives, http://grandeguerre.icrc.org/en/List/4889879/698/11126,
last accessed 17 January 2017.
116  
Desmond Morton, Silent Battle: Canadian Prisoners of War in Germany 19141919, (Toronto: Lester Publishing Limited, 1992), 137. Bromley would have been
entitled to a $420 gratuity.
117  
A deceased ex-prisoner of war’s family was entitled to a pension if the soldier had
not been taken prisoner through neglect or misconduct. See Appendix 1 to Chapter
XX, RG9, III-B-1-33, Volume 2921, P-248-33, LAC.
118  
John Westacott, service file RG150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 10244-8, LAC.
112  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol27/iss2/16

26

Pascas: Clay-kickers of Flanders Fields
PA S C A S

27

no casualties incurred between the 11th and 20th. In fact, the main
body of the 2nd CTC had been temporarily attached to the 1st and
3rd CTCs on 8 June at St. Eloi, the Bluff and Hill 60.
Westacott was granted a commission on 21 June and was taken
on strength that day by the 2nd CTC. The Daily Orders for 28
September 1916 state that Lieut. J. Westacott was invalided (sick)
on 15 September. Several medical boards reported he suffered
from severe influenza after falling ill on 26 August, and he was
hospitalised in England on 15 September for a week. However, in
War Underground, Barrie relates the ongoing feats of Westacott
combatting the invading Germans underground once more at Mount
Sorrel on 15 and 16 September 1916, where sixty of the eighty-man
tunnelling shift allegedly became casualties—including Westacott.
But there is no record of this brutal battle in the 2nd CTC’s war
diary and these casualties are not chronicled in the Daily Orders.
Trenches and tunnels at Mount Sorrel were not attacked during
the night of 15 September. Moreover, only nine battle casualties
had been recorded for the entire month of September.119 Westacott
had reconstructed two fictitious underground battles in June and
September 1916. He suffered a complete breakdown after the war.120
Sadly, the “natural penchant for mendacity” among some veterans
rendered their accounts unreliable.121

conclusion
The accomplishments of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd CTC companies in
1916 and 1917 were solid contributions to the success of the Battle of
Messines Ridge. The 1st and 3rd CTCs laboured at twelve locations.
Mines were blown at seven: St. Eloi, Kruisstraat, Spanbroekmolen,
Hill 60, the Caterpillar, Trench 122, and Trench 127. The Canadian
tunnellers laid, charged, wired, and tamped the St. Eloi, Hill 60,
and the Caterpillar mines. They toiled on defensive, abandoned,
unfinished or unfired tunnels at five sites: the Bluff, Trench 123,
119  
Casualties by Days-France and Belgium: September 1916, RG150, Volume 494,
LAC. Inexplicably, the eight casualties inflicted by a minenwerfer on 16 September
are not recorded here.
120  
Barton et al., Beneath Flanders Fields, 289.
121  
Russel G. Hann, “Introduction,” The Great War and Canadian Society: An Oral
History, ed. by Daphne Read, (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1978), 28.
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Trench 121 (Birdcage), Seaforth, and La Petite Douve Farm. They
fired five mines totalling 241,600 lb (109,588 kg) of explosive at St.
Eloi, Trench 122, and Trench 127. St. Eloi was the only blown mine
of considerable depth in Ypresian clay—a much tougher substance
to penetrate than Paniselian clay.
At least forty-nine mines had been suggested and more than
twenty-five mines had been completed or were in progress by 7 June
1917.122 For example, tunnelling in the 720-foot gallery at Seaforth
Farm off Trench 131 was abandoned on 11 May 1917 after time ran
out.123 Nevertheless, twenty-five mines were charged: nineteen were
blown, four were prepared but not fired, and two were lost.124
On 17 July 1955, Birdcage Mine No. 3 exploded during a
thunderstorm. An armoured firing cable connecting Shaft M4 to Mine
No. 3, via Shaft M1, had been maintained decades before by the 3rd
CTC.125 If the cable “… came close to the surface, the buildup of static
in a thunderstorm, or a lightning strike could induce sufficient current
to initiate the detonators.”126 The detonators, primers, and 26,000 lb
(11,793 kg) of ammonal in waterproof rubberised bags in the flooded
tunnel had remained in remarkably good condition. Fortunately no
one suffered in the blast, but the “… milk yield of several dozen dairy
cows took a sharp downward turn.”127
The owners of La Petite Douve Farm, the Mahieu family, rebuilt
it after the war and renamed it La Basse Cour. La Petite Douve
mine—with its 50,000 lb (22,679 kg) charge—lies 70 feet beneath a
barn, next to the farmhouse. “It doesn’t stop me sleeping at night,”
said M. Mahieu, 60, living at the farm with his wife and daughter
when interviewed by a British journalist.128 A farm has also been
built over the abandoned Peckham mine with its 20,000 lb (9,071
kg) charge. Today, five Messines mines containing 156,000 lb (70,760
kg) of explosives lie dormant beneath the battlefield. The number of

Barton et al, Beneath Flanders Fields, 166.
WD, 3rd CTC, 11 May 1917, LAC.
124  
Nineteen mines were fired on 1 July 1916 at the Somme, but eleven were very
small. See Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1917 Volume II, 38n.
125  
Trench 121 Map, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4435, Folder 23, File 5, LAC.
126  
Robinson, “The Abandoned Messines Mines,” 9.
127  
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128  
Neil Tweedie, “Farmer who is sitting on a bomb,” The Telegraph, 12 January
2004.
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abandoned smaller mines and camouflets cannot be ascertained. Can
any of these mines be detonated today? Opinion is divided.
The German multi-zone defence-in-depth scheme of 1917 and
their 1918 spring offensive, plus the return to open warfare of the
last hundred days ended the vast time-consuming underground work,
such as the nine-and-a-half month siege operation at St. Eloi. In
1918, tunnelling companies concentrated on defensive work including
dugouts, pillboxes, and trenches. After the Hindenburg Line was
breached, the 3rd CTC repaired roads, cleared mines, and graded
tracks on captured ground.
June 1917 had marked the culmination of the tunnellers siege-warfare
art. Messines Ridge was the last large-scale mining offensive of the war.
Later that month, Field Marshal Haig conveyed his congratulations to
the tunnellers: “I consider that the splendid work of these Tunnelling
Companies carried out under the most trying conditions has played a
very large part in the success of the recent operations.”129

appendix
Mine

Shaft

Depth (ft/m)

Charge (lb/kg)

No. 1

M1

60/18

34,000/15,422

No. 2

M1

60/18

32,000/14,514

No. 3

M1

65/20

26,000/11,793

No. 4

M3

60/18

20,000/9,072

Table 1. The Birdcage mines.
Note: All charges were ammonal in 50-lb tins. Each charge had
eighteen detonators in three series of six each.130

WD, 3rd CTC, June 1917, 15, LAC.
Trench 121, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4431, Folder 21, File 1, LAC; Plan of trenches,
WD, 3rd CTC, April 1917, 31, LAC.
129  
130  
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Mine Name

Charge
(lb/kg)

Depth of
Charge

Method
of Firing

(ft/m)

Hill 60 “A”

53,500/24,267

90/27

Power

Caterpillar “B”

70,000/31,751

100/30

Power

St. Eloi

95,600/43,363

125/38

Exploder

Hollandscheschuur No. 1

34,200/15,512

60/18

Exploder

Hollandscheschuur No. 2

14,900/6,758

55/17

Exploder

Hollandscheschuur No. 3

17,500/7,937

55/17

Exploder

Petit Bois No. 1 Right

30,000/13,607

70/21

Power

Petit Bois No. 2 Left

30,000/13,607

57/17

Power

Maedelstede Farm

94,000/42,637

100/30

Power

Peckham

87,000/39,462

70/21

Exploder

Spanbroekmolen

91,000/41,276

88/27

Power

Kruisstraat No. 1 and
No. 4

49,500/22,452

57/17

Power

Kruisstraat No. 2

30,000/13,607

62/19

Power

Kruisstraat No. 3

30,000/13,607

50/15

Power

Ontario Farm

60,000/27,215

103/31

Exploder

Trench 127 No. 7 Left

36,000/16,329

75/23

Exploder

Trench 127 No. 8 Right

50,000/22,679

76/23

Exploder

Trench 122 No. 5 Left

20,000/9,071

60/18

Exploder

Trench 122 No. 6 Right

40,000/18,143

75/23

Exploder

Table 2. The nineteen Messines Ridge mines blown on 7 June 1917131
Note: “Power” indicates an external dynamo detonated the mine,
in which a double-pole knife switch was thrown connecting the
current from the dynamo to the switchboard’s multiple circuits to

131  
The Work of the Royal Engineers in the European War, 1914-19, Summary of
Offensive Mines, 7.6.17 Plate XVIII. Some of the weights and depths differ with
those in the Second Army Offensive Mines Table A, 7 June 1917 chart e.g. Trench
122 No. 5 is 36,000 lb (16,329 kg). See RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4427, Folder 2, File 1,
LAC.
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the detonators. Each circuit had a backup exploder. Plunging the
exploder’s T-bar handle rotated a highly-geared internal dynamo,
which generated an electrical charge down the wires connected to
the two knobs on the exploder box setting off an electrical detonator
to fire a primer. All charges contained ammonal. Some mines also
included blastine, guncotton or gelignite.
◆

◆

◆

◆
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